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The Effect of Cooperatives On Innovation 
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 7/15/05
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$83.05
133.92
115.60
140.81
77.56
43.27
82.19
*
229.58
$83.18
154.75
116.86
139.63
69.64
49.93
68.52
116.00
256.56
$80.00
142.21
118.89
133.87
66.21
49.09
69.47
105.00
250.87
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.60
2.33
6.87
3.46
1.60
3.02
1.98
7.11
3.11
1.79
3.16
2.14
6.98
3.66
1.94
Hay
 Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
115.00
55.00
62.50
115.00
62.50
57.50
117.50
37.50
52.50
* No market.
Innovation activity is a critical element of business
conduct affecting the competitiveness of firms, the
arrival rate of innovations in the economy, productivity
growth and social welfare. The strategic interactions
among firms and their effect on innovation have
received considerable attention in the economic
literature with the main focus being on innovation
competition in a pure oligopoly – i.e., a market in
which a small number of profit-maximizing, investor-
owned firms (IOFs) operate. 
In agriculture, pure oligopolies are typically not
observed, particularly at levels close to the primary
production sector; instead, cooperatives (co-ops) are
often involved in these sectors accounting for between
25 percent and 30 percent of total farm marketing and
supply expenditures. Despite their prevalence, the
effect of co-ops on innovation activity has not been
considered. While previous research has focused on
the strategic interaction between co-ops and IOFs in
oligopolistic industries and the role that co-ops play in
promoting competition, this research has not consid-
ered the impact that co-ops have on innovation activity
in these mixed markets and the resulting impact of this
activity on the firms’ cost structure and pricing deci-
sions.
In an article that was published in the latest issue of
the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, we
address this issue and examine the impact of coopera-
tive involvement in process innovation on the amount
of innovation in an industry, the pricing behavior of
the competitors before and after the innovation is
undertaken and the social welfare resulting from this
competition. Specifically, the article examines a mixed
duopoly where an open membership, welfare-maxi-
mizing co-op and an IOF compete in supplying an
input to agricultural producers.
It is important to note that a co-op is an organiza-
tion in which the owners are also the users of the
products/services supplied by the organization. This
dual role of the member creates both advantages and
disadvantages for the co-op. With members as both
owners and users, the co-op is typically assumed to
have a different objective function than its IOF
counterparts. By focusing on member welfare rather
than profits, the co-op is able to generate more com-
petitive pricing. 
The cooperative structure also has some draw-
backs. These drawbacks revolve around the so-called
property rights problems that have been identified in
co-ops. These property rights problems typically
emerge because of the non-discriminatory nature of
most traditional open membership co-ops. Since all
members have access to the benefits of the co-op
regardless of their investment in the organization,
free-rider problems emerge. As well, the lack of
tradability in ownership shares that is typically found
in open membership co-ops has been linked to portfo-
lio and horizon problems. Co-ops have addressed
some of these property rights issues by relying on cash
flow or retained patronage to finance growth. 
The need to rely on retained earnings, when
combined with the fact that the co-op must compete
with the IOF, means that the co-op faces a trade-off.
While it is able to raise additional capital by raising its
price, doing so diminishes its competitiveness and
reduces the number of producers who find it optimal
to patronize the co-op and finance its investment
activities. Although the co-op is constrained in its
ability to raise investment capital, our analysis shows
that its focus on member welfare maximization
enables it to compete effectively with its IOF counter-
parts. Our research thus sheds important light on open
membership co-ops’ ability to survive in the agricul-
tural sector despite the constraints imposed by their
property right structure.
In particular, our analysis reveals that the member
welfare maximizing co-op charges lower prices and
has incentives to undertake higher innovation effort
than its profit-maximizing rival. The incentives to
innovate are greater for the co-op because it
internalizes the effect of reduced costs and prices (due
to process innovation) on the welfare of its members.
This internalization occurs because the co-op maxi-
mizes member welfare rather than profits. 
It is important to note that, while cooperative
involvement can increase the amount of innovation
undertaken by the input suppliers, total innovation
does not necessarily have to increase in order for
farmers to benefit from the presence of the co-op –
even if the total innovation effort falls in the mixed
oligopoly, producer welfare still increases in the
presence of the co-op. The reason is that the presence
of the welfare maximizing co-op results in reduced
agricultural input prices that benefit both members and
non-members of the co-op. Note that, due to the
pricing strategy of the co-op and the reduced price-cost
margin of the IOF in the mixed oligopoly, the increase
in producer welfare exceeds the reduction in suppliers’
profits, indicating that the presence of the co-op
increases total economic welfare in this market.
Overall, our research shows that co-ops do possess
some potential organizational advantages, not just with
respect to pricing as has been previously shown in the
literature, but also with respect to investment in
innovation activity. Since this investment in innovation
affects the prices charged by both the co-op and the
IOF, and consequently the profits of the IOF and the
welfare of all agricultural producers, the factors
affecting co-op innovation activity are of interest to all
players in the agricultural industry. 
Konstantinos Giannakas, (402) 472-2041
Associate Professor
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Note: This article is based on Giannakas, K. and M.
Fulton. “Process Innovation Activity in a Mixed
Oligopoly: The Role of Cooperatives.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(May 2005):
406-422.
